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The core of Italian HS rail plan is the Turin – Salerno line, in operation since 2009. The central segment 
Milan – Rome has been working well since the opening, with good demand figures quite in line with the 
later forecasts. The extremes of the line, namely the extensions to Turin and to Naples/Salerno has remained 
for long far less used. In 2012, unique case in Europe, a newcomer entered in the market and pushed a 
radical change in Trenitalia marketing, quality and pricing. This positive fact has fostered the market, with 
supply and demand dramatically increased, reduced fares and distributed benefits to the users, also in terms 
of new mobility practices.  
The paper aims at revising a former Cost Benefit Analysis exercise, produced just two years after line 
opening, in the light of the changed conditions. In particular, applying a similar methodology and estimating 
on the basis of third-party sources the current Origin-Destination demand matrix, we will recalculate the 
economic feasibility indicators. 
The cost-benefit analysis gives a marginally positive result in the most-likely case. To the contrary, 
extrapolating pre-competition trends without competition, gives a very negative result. In fact, we show 
that travel time benefits are a fraction of the cost. The largest benefits comes from the new demand, which 
in turn comes from increased frequency, from the introduction of mixed traditional/high-speed services and 
from the fall in prices due to the entrance of NTV. 
 




The core of Italian HS rail plan is the Turin – Salerno line, in operation since 2009. The 
central segment Milan – Rome has been working well since the opening, with good 
demand figures quite in line with the later forecasts. The extremes of the line, namely the 
extensions to Turin and to Naples/Salerno have remained for long far less used. In 2012, 
unique case in Europe (Beria and Grimaldi, 2017), a newcomer entered in the market and 
pushed a radical change in Trenitalia marketing, quality and pricing. This positive fact 
has fostered the market, with supply and demand dramatically increased, reduced fares 
and distributed benefits to the users, also in terms of new mobility practices.  
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The paper’s first aim is to revise the results of a former Cost Benefit Analysis (Beria 
and Grimaldi, 2011), produced just two years after line opening, in the light of the 
changed conditions. At those times we estimated 2010 traffic figures as quite far from the 
thresholds needed to justify the 32 billion Euro investment in socio-economic terms. In 
particular, we found that on the Milan-Turin the traffic was as low as 9.5% of the needed 
level, and on the Milan-Bologna, the best performing line according to our indicators, at 
73.6%. These results were calculated using the methodology suggested by de Rus and 
Nombela (2007) and de Rus and Nash (2007) and hypothesising a long-term traffic 
growth of 3% p.a., which looked quite generous at the time. 
Few years after, we observe that demand did not evolve linearly, but had very steep 
increases between 2012 and 2015, unforeseeable looking at 2011 data. Already in 2013, 
12.3 billion passenger-km travelled on high-speed services, 2.2 times the figures of 2010. 
A relevant component of this increase is due to, the entrance of a private newcomer - 
NTV – in the Italian high-speed market, providing services in competition with the ones 
of the former incumbent, Trenitalia, and engaging with it a harsh competition in terms of 
prices and supply quality.  
A second aim of the work is to discuss the socio-economic effect of alternative 
scenarios, both for the actual and the do-nothing one. In particular, we will evaluate what 
would have happened if no new line was built, if competition had not developed or if it 
had developed anyway on the conventional network. Apart the realism of some of these 
alternatives (for example, it is unsustainable that a level of supply such as the current one 
is compatible with the historical 2-tracks line), this exercise will allow to separate the 
effect of the “high-speed” from the effect of new capacity and that of competition.  
The following of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the case and 
in particular discusses how competition developed. Section 3 explains the scenarios and 
how the evaluation was performed. Section 4 presents the results of the analysis and 
Section 5 provides some policy indications at the light of the results. For easiness of 
reading, all methodological aspects and assumptions done are collected in the Annex. 
2. The Italian case of high-speed and the effect of competition 
2.1 History of the project 
The project for the Italian HSR (in Italia “Alta Velocità”, from here on AV) dates back 
to 1990. Initially, it was to be a new system, independent from the rest of the network. 
The project foresaw a T-shaped network: from Turin to Venice (west to east) and from 
Milan to Naples (north to south). To date, the line is operational between Turin and 
Naples, while from Milan to Venice is under construction. However, the characteristics 
of the line has changed substantially, from being a passengers-only line to a mixed line, 
including also numerous interconnections. This design change had substantially increased 
the cost of the line, making the Italian HS (more properly called High Speed/High 
Capacity) the most expensive one in Europe, per km (Campos et al., 2009 and Nash, 
2015). 
This network should have been built through Project Financing by a new mixed society, 
called TAV SpA, with a 60% of private capital to be completely repaid and the rest owned 
by the Italian state. This however did not happen and already in 1998, a public fund had 
to buy back the entire stock of shares of TAV, due to the unavailability of private 
shareholders to provide entitled capitals (RFI, 2007). The story ended with the forced 




take-over of 13 billion Euros of TAV debts by the State balance (Beria and Ponti, 2009) 
and the return of the line under the control of RFI, the national network operator. 
From the perspective of economic feasibility, the issue of cost-rise plays a key role, as 
we will underline also in Section 4. From an initial estimation of 10.7 billion€ in 1992 for 
the Turin – Salerno line, the bill was of 32.0 billion€ already in 2006 (RFI, 2007), 
doubling in real terms1. This gives a per km cost of 24 M€ (Rome-Naples) to 68 (Bologna-
Florence, almost entirely in tunnel), with the worst case being the 54 M€/km of the Milan-
Turin, totally in plain and excluding urban accesses. From the benefits side, to date, there 
was no freight train using the line and interconnections are used only in a few cases, 
resulting in no actual benefit from those extra-costs. 
 
2.2 The effect of competition 
As we outlined in a former contribution (Beria and Grimaldi, 2017), the entrance of 
NTV in the Italian high-speed rail market is a relevant exception in the field, since it is 
the only worldwide case of on-track competition. The only other cases take place on 
conventional intercity services, such as MTR Express in Sweden, WESTbahn in Austria 
or RegioJet and LeoExpress in the Czech Republic. 
 
 
Figure 1. The network of Italian fast trains, including full high speed ones (Frecciarossa, Frecciabianca, 
Frecciargento, Italo). Source: Beria and Grimaldi, 2017. 
 
The competition started in 2012, a few years after the full opening of the HS line (2009), 
probably when the former market situation was still consolidating. Despite the financial 
weakness of the competitor, up to now the effects and the changes to market have been 
large. They basically lay in three fields: quality, which improved, quantity, which also 
increased in terms of seats and frequencies, and prices, which surely decreased, even with 
different patterns. 
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Concerning the last point, prices, Cascetta and Coppola (2014) suggest a reduction in 
average fares of high-speed services (on routes benefiting from competition) by 31% 
between 2011 and 2012; in a following study, they confirm a reduction by 34% in two 
years. 
Bergantino et al. (2015) study both supply and prices. They outline how the incumbent 
did not reduce the supply after the entrance of the competitor, so that the overall capacity 
of the Rome-Milan pair increased by 56% in 2012. Also fares are studied, finding that 
both the incumbent and the newcomer adopted strategic pricing behaviours (i.e. fares of 
both companies are influenced by fares of the others). They do not find evidence of 
predatory pricing by the incumbent, whose fares remain on average 29.92%-34.67% 
higher than the ones of the newcomer. They also find evidence of a significant effect on 
fares of competing air services, which reduced up to 13.26 € on the Rome-Milan route.  
Beria et al. (forthcoming) study another line, the Milan - Ancona, looking at before and 
after NTV entrance prices. They find that one year after competition, looking at a 3-
months comparable period, incumbent prices have decreased of 10-20% (according to 
booking advance) and newcomer’s are further slightly lower. 
3. The evaluation of a new infrastructure with triggered competition 
3.1 Definition of scenarios 
Available figures show that the opening of the Turin-Salerno HS infrastructure in late 
2009, rose demand volumes of about 50% in the first year of operation (Beria and 
Grimaldi, 2011). However, the impact of opening the market to competition three years 
later was much more impressive. Operated services increased from 70,802 km/day in 
2010 to 120,897 km/day in 2013 (+70.7%). Demand volumes rose from 5.6 billion 
passenger-km in 2010 to 12.3 billion in 2013 (+119.5%; Dell’Alba and Velardi, 2015), 
but the following years were similarly impressive, even if no precise data is publicly 
available. 
Given these facts, we use the Italian case to discuss how the contemporary opening of 
a new infrastructure and of competition in the market on it, influence generated welfare. 
Actually, this comparison depends on the observed demand figures, but also on the 
counterfactual situation: what would have happened if no infrastructure or no competition 
have existed? How much of welfare generated is due to one fact or to the other or to the 
existence of both?  
To do that, we carry out an ex-post cost-benefit analysis of 6 alternative compositions 
of intervention and reference scenarios, summarised in Table 1. The alternatives imply 
different compositions in terms of infrastructure investment (HS lines are built or not) 
and of the degree of competition (full, “half” or no competition). The degree of 
competition is intended in terms of increase in overall supply and users (in this sense, the 
“half” competition alternatives entail a half increase in supply and users) and reduction 
in fares. In the absence of any transferable evidence, the reduction in average fares (from 
0.12 to 0.09 €/passenger-km, see Annex) is set to be the same in the full and “half” 
competition alternatives, and zero in the no-competition alternatives. 
Alternatives 1.a, 1.b and 1.c compare the present situation (infrastructure+competition) 
with a reference case in which the HS line was not built. The subcases consider the degree 
of competition in the reference scenario. Alternative 2 is an unreal case in which the new 
HS line is built, but no competition takes place. This is the cost benefit analysis of the 
infrastructure. Alternatives 3.a and 3.b are also unreal cases in which HS lines are not 




built, but competition takes place on conventional network both in the reference and 
intervention scenarios. 
To reduce the complexity, we fixed the trend from 2013 onwards, assuming a declining 
increase of traffic in the intervention alternative: +6% 2014, 1% since 2020 and +0% 
since 2030. All other cases are left to scenarios: the increase of demand after competition 
and the traffic trend in the reference case. 
 
Alternative Intervention Reference 
1.a HS lines built  
Full competition 
HS lines not built 
No competition 
1.b HS lines built  
Full competition  
HS lines not built 
“Half” competition 
1.c HS lines built 
Full competition 
HS lines not built 
Full competition  
2 HS lines built 
No competition 
HS lines not built 
No competition 
3.a HS lines not built 
Full competition 
HS lines not built 
No competition 
3.b HS lines not built 
“Half” competition 
HS lines not built 
No competition 
Table 1. Description of different alternatives in terms of infrastructure investment and competition level 
in the intervention and reference scenarios (our elaboration) 
Figure 2 represents the amount of users of HSR services in the reference and 
intervention for the six scenarios; volumes of passengers and services for some years are 
provided in Table 8 (Annex). For example, case 2 shows the trends of the demand that 
we would have had if no competition had taken place: an increase of demand in 2010 
when the line is opened and an increasing trend in the following years similar to the one 
of the base case. Scenario 1.a is the one with most difference between intervention and 
reference and thus the one with most benefits: the opening of the line generated sufficient 
capacity and momentum to unlock also the competition, which, in turn, boosted the 
demand. We believe that the most realistic reference scenario is something between 1.a 
and 1.b: some competition could have taken place on the traditional line (similarly to what 
has happened in Austria or Czech Republic), but its impact would have been capped by 


















Figure 2. Million-passenger*km in the intervention and reference scenarios for the different analysed 
infrastructure and competition alternatives (our elaboration). 
3.2 Assessment methodology 
The evaluation is carried out according to standard methodology, as explained in the 
Annex. To calculate benefits for users we used the conventional ‘Rule of Half’, as 
represented in Figure 3. Users’ benefits are based on perceived costs and include saved 
travel and waiting times and – particularly important in our case – a reduction in fares. 
The component of reduction in fares for existing users instead represents a transfer within 
the society (a benefit for the users, an equivalent cost for the producers): in this sense, the 




Figure 3. Variation in users' surplus due to saved travel and waiting time and saved fare, using the 'Rule 
of Half' (our elaboration). The light rectangle is a transfer among users and producers, and thus not 
contributing to NPV, while the rest is a net societal benefit. 
The cost-benefit analysis is carried out separately for six line sections, where most of 
the traffic attributable to the HS line occurs. Four are the new HS line segments. The other 




two are the Florence-Rome, where a high-speed line was built in the previous decades 
(and whose cost is not included in the current evaluation, as well as travel time benefits) 
and the Venice-Bologna, a conventional line used by Venice-Rome services once the new 
line is left. These segments have been considered because, although travel times did not 
change, users benefited from an increase in services (and a consequent reduction in 
average waiting times) and from a reduction in fares, directly caused by the construction 
of HSR and of the market opening.  
The CBA performed is considering, as usual, all direct and indirect effects: users 
benefits, investment, running costs, externalities, induced demand benefits. However, 
calculations show that the new demand is so high that the triangle of the surplus is much 
higher than the rectangle of existing users. This is the typical situation in which the linear 
hypothesis of the rule-of-half may fail, and in which wider effects may be not negligible. 
This may drive to underestimation of benefits. 
4. Results 
The aggregated results of the analysis for the six scenarios are reported in Table 2. 
Further tables provide details for a selection of them, line segment by line segment. In 
particular, Table 3 reports scenario 1.a (current situation vs. no investment and no 
competition) Table 4 scenario 2 (investment on the line, but no competition) and Table 5 
scenario 3.b (no investment and some competition on the traditional tracks). 
Tables include all costs and benefits sources. Consumers’ surplus is made by travel and 
waiting time benefits and reduction in fares. New users also generate extra revenues for 
the operator, which is a net benefit with respect to previous non-trips or trips done by car. 
For this reason, perceived costs are also corrected for reduction in fuel taxes and tolls. In 
addition, also environmental externalities are considered for car and air shifters and 
obviously all additional operating costs of line and trains. 
A first consideration is that, in all the considered scenarios, the new infrastructure and 
the competition “spread” their benefits well beyond the four sections where new lines 
where built; in fact, socio-economic profitability indicators improve significantly 
including the two sections Florence-Rome and Bologna-Venice, where no new lines were 
built but many high-speed services previously not existing do operate. 
The scenarios with best indicators are 3.a and 3.b (Table 2). This is quite obvious: they 
entail no investment but include the large benefits of competition. The result is that 
competition generated a net benefit for Italian society of 5 to 7 billion€. These come from 
a reduction of fares from existing users, but especially from the additional revenues 
(which represent a benefit) of new users, not travelling by train at previous fare levels. 
The only problem with these scenarios is that they are totally hypothetical: the lines 
considered were near to saturation, except Florence – Rome and Rome – Naples and 
consequently the supply we have now would have been impossible. In this sense, a more 
realistic (but impossible here) scenario would have included some investment cost for 
capacity expansion, but not at HS standards. 
Scenario 2 is the “typical” assessment of a new infrastructure. Its result, for the present 
case, is clearly negative. Travel time savings and benefits for the new users account to 
some 10 billion€, plus some external benefits from car trips avoided, but they are very far 
from the investment needed for the new line (32 billion€ reduced by conversion 
coefficients). This means that, without the competition which took place after 2012, this 
investment would have been extremely negative from the socio-economic viewpoint, in 
line with previous estimations (Beria and Grimaldi, 2011). 




Alternative 1.a 1.b 1.c 2 3.a 3.b   
Intervention | HS lines Yes Yes Yes Yes No No   
Intervention | competition Full Full Full No Full "Half"   
Reference | HS lines No No No No No No   
Reference | competition No "Half" Full No No No   
Investment -25.451 -25.451 -25.451 -25.451 0 0 M€2010 
Residual value 4.579 4.579 4.579 4.579 0 0 M€2010 
Travel time benefits 6.346 7.092 7.637 4.258 0 0 M€2010 
Waiting time benefits 1.640 1.281 1.017 751 638 68 M€2010 
Reduction in fares (due to competition) 2.612 0 0 0 1.301 712 M€2010 
New operating costs of lines and services -12.479 -12.479 -12.479 -10.535 -9.667 -7.634 M€2010 
Saved operating costs of lines and services 7.872 9.689 10.842 7.872 7.872 7.872 M€2010 
Revenues generated by new rail users 16.244 11.892 8.809 7.235 7.872 4.306 M€2010 
Saved external costs (car) 2.773 2.048 1.517 934 1.353 740 M€2010 
Saved external costs (air) 1.095 809 599 369 534 292 M€2010 
Lost fuel taxes and motorway tolls (car) -4.502 -3.325 -2.463 -1.517 -2.197 -1.202 M€2010 
Generated rail services external costs -960 -960 -960 -810 -671 -530 M€2010 
Saved rail services external costs 492 606 678 492 492 492 M€2010 
NPV (Benefits - Costs) 260 -4.219 -5.676 -11.824 7.527 5.116 M€2010 
NBIR (Net Benefits / Investment) 1,01 0,83 0,78 0,54 N.A. N.A.   
BCR (Benefits / Costs) 1,01 0,90 0,86 0,69 1,60 1,55   
Table 2. Comparison among the results of cost-benefit analysis in different alternatives, for the whole network of HS services (our elaboration) 
 




1.a: Intervention: HS lines and full competition 



















Investment -7,550 -6,705 -5,698 -5,498 -25,451 0 0 -25,451 M€2010 
Residual value 1,359 1,206 1,025 989 4,579 0 0 4,579 M€2010 
Travel time benefits 712 2,777 1,542 1,315 6,346 0 0 6,346 M€2010 
Waiting time benefits 626 257 187 243 1,312 147 181 1,640 M€2010 
Reduction in fares (due to competition) 122 613 332 418 1,486 125 1,001 2,612 M€2010 
New operating costs of lines and services -648 -2,640 -1,652 -2,083 -7,023 -771 -4,685 -12,479 M€2010 
Saved operating costs of lines and services 158 1,646 1,165 1,129 4,097 492 3,282 7,872 M€2010 
Revenues generated by new rail users 755 3,814 2,083 2,580 9,233 771 6,239 16,244 M€2010 
Saved external costs (car) 129 651 355 441 1,576 132 1,065 2,773 M€2010 
Saved external costs (air) 51 257 140 174 622 52 420 1,095 M€2010 
Lost fuel taxes and motorway tolls (car) -210 -1,057 -576 -717 -2,559 -214 -1,728 -4,502 M€2010 
Generated rail services external costs -50 -203 -127 -160 -540 -59 -360 -960 M€2010 
Saved rail services external costs 10 103 73 71 256 31 205 492 M€2010 
NPV (Benefits - Costs) -4,537 719 -1,150 -1,097 -6,065 706 5,619 260 M€2010 
NBIR (Net Benefits / Investment) 0.40 1.11 0.80 0.80 0.76 N.D. N.D. 1.01 
  
BCR (Benefits / Costs) 0.46 1.07 0.86 0.87 0.83 1.68 1.83 1.01 
  









2: Intervention: HS lines, no competition                       



















Investment -7.550 -6.705 -5.698 -5.498 -25.451 0 0 -25.451 M€2010 
Residual value 1.359 1.206 1.025 989 4.579 0 0 4.579 M€2010 
Travel time benefits 382 1.934 1.198 744 4.258 0 0 4.258 M€2010 
Waiting time benefits 233 147 154 73 608 38 105 751 M€2010 
Reduction in fares (due to competition) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 M€2010 
New operating costs of lines and services -381 -2.307 -1.694 -1.393 -5.776 -544 -4.215 -10.535 M€2010 
Saved operating costs of lines and services 158 1.646 1.165 1.129 4.097 492 3.282 7.872 M€2010 
Revenues generated by new rail users 92 1.779 1.244 807 3.922 269 3.044 7.235 M€2010 
Saved external costs (car) 12 230 161 104 507 35 393 934 M€2010 
Saved external costs (air) 5 91 63 41 200 14 155 369 M€2010 
Lost fuel taxes and motorway tolls (car) -19 -373 -261 -169 -822 -56 -638 -1.517 M€2010 
Generated rail services external costs -29 -177 -130 -107 -444 -42 -324 -810 M€2010 
Saved rail services external costs 10 103 73 71 256 31 205 492 M€2010 
NPV (Benefits - Costs) -5.731 -2.427 -2.700 -3.209 -14.067 237 2.006 -11.824 M€2010 
NBIR (Net Benefits / Investment) 0,24 0,64 0,53 0,42 0,45 N.A. N.A. 0,54   
BCR (Benefits / Costs) 0,28 0,75 0,65 0,55 0,57 1,37 1,39 0,69   









3.b: Intervention:  no HS lines, "half" competition                       



















Investment 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 M€2010 
Residual value 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 M€2010 
Travel time benefits 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 M€2010 
Waiting time benefits 159 -8 -28 12 136 -27 -40 68 M€2010 
Reduction in fares (due to competition) 43 164 83 121 411 36 265 712 M€2010 
New operating costs of lines and services -326 -1.623 -1.091 -1.185 -4.225 -443 -2.966 -7.634 M€2010 
Saved operating costs of lines and services 158 1.646 1.165 1.129 4.097 492 3.282 7.872 M€2010 
Revenues generated by new rail users 258 994 500 734 2.486 215 1.605 4.306 M€2010 
Saved external costs (car) 44 171 86 126 427 37 276 740 M€2010 
Saved external costs (air) 18 67 34 50 169 15 109 292 M€2010 
Lost fuel taxes and motorway tolls (car) -72 -277 -140 -205 -694 -60 -448 -1.202 M€2010 
Generated rail services external costs -23 -113 -76 -82 -293 -31 -206 -530 M€2010 
Saved rail services external costs 10 103 73 71 256 31 205 492 M€2010 
NPV (Benefits - Costs) 268 1.125 607 770 2.770 265 2.082 5.116 M€2010 
NBIR (Net Benefits / Investment) N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D. N.D.   
BCR (Benefits / Costs) 1,64 1,56 1,45 1,52 1,53 1,47 1,57 1,55   









Finally, group 1 scenarios are the most interesting because considering both the benefits 
of competition and of the high-speed. In our case, just scenario 1.a (reference without any 
competition, the most likely to have happened) reaches the breakeven of the indicators 
and thus results marginally positive. Benefits come from reduced travel time (about 6 
billion€), but this component is not the main one. Additional benefits are due to the 
Mohring effect for increased train frequency (1.6 billion€). Reduction in fares for existing 
users give further 2.6 billion€. However, these effects together would have been largely 
insufficient to justify the investment. The largest benefit comes from the revenues of new 
users. As already commented, this is a net societal benefit because accounts for the higher 
willingness to pay for a train ride in substitution for other options (car, plane or no trip).  
Dividing the effect on the four new segments of the line, the best performing one is the 
Milan – Bologna. Its cost was relatively low and the traffic is the highest after the Bologna 
– Florence, which in turn cost much more because in tunnel. The worst performing is the 
Milan – Turin. In this case the cost was outstandingly high, the traffic is quite low (it is 
the terminal part of the line) and a lot of reasonably fast regional trains still exist between 
the two cities at a much lower price. The Venice – Bologna and Florence – Rome 
segments have no investment and no travel time benefits, but account for the increase of 
traffic due to the speeding of the rest of the lines. 
In conclusion, only the combined effect of new line and head-on competition has 
generated a sufficient amount of benefits to barely justify the investment. The problem of 
this project lays, as it is nowadays clear, in the cost side. The investment cost has exploded 
for various reasons (RFI, 2007), especially because of design choices and tendering 
procedure. If it had costs in line with comparable European cases, its socio-economic 
indicators would have been significantly better. The next section will further comment on 
that. 
5. Policy indications 
We have shown through the CBA that the direct effect of high-speed, namely a higher 
speed for existing users, is just a marginal benefit for the investment. In itself, it proved 
not capable to boost the demand to a level capable to generate the needed benefits.  
The first policy indication is that competition, and its consequences in terms of fares, 
quality and frequency, had generated a substantial part of the benefits and, unexpectedly, 
had improved the performance of a project that, just five years ago, was far from viability 
(Beria and Grimaldi, 2011). It is meaningless to quantify them, because all effects are 
interrelated, but in our case the NBIR without competition is half than the one with 
competition. This means that making a CBA without estimating the effect of competition 
may substantially underestimate benefits. And, more interestingly, that high density 
corridors may generate huge benefits if there is competition. 
A second issue is specific of the Italian case, but might be relevant also elsewhere. In 
this case, the direct benefit of speed is marginal. The turning point was capacity, as the 
line was saturated and no more regular slots were available. So, a fast doubling (maybe 
250km/h instead of 300 km/h) could have given a substantial part of the observed benefits, 
at a much lower cost. Travel time benefits would have been smaller, but frequency and 
competition-related ones would have been similar. This would be even more true for a 
shorter but denser corridor, such as the Milan – Venice, where a new HS infrastructure is 
now being planned (and partially built). In this case, cities are less than 100km far from 
each other, but capacity constraints are the same and thus also the benefits in terms of 
frequency and fares. It is probably unnecessary to mention that a capacity expansion 




obtained with technological improvements would have been even more similar to our 
fictitious case 3.a (capacity expansion, full competition at no investment cost). 
This second issue is related with that of investment costs. A more “frugal” investment, 
avoiding overdesign, focused on passenger trains, reducing locally the speed and the 
works of art, would have cost  much less. Even more unjustified is the extra-cost due to 
the lack of tendering for civil works. RFI (2007) speaks about a 14-20% extra-cost for 
this reason. Assuming a realistic -25% investment cost (equal to 24 M€/km), the NBIR 
would have been 1.29 and the NPV positive for 5.5 billion€. 
6. Conclusions 
The debate on megaprojects takes often the shape of ideology. Assessment techniques, 
and cost-benefit analysis in particular, aim at clarifying the effects and their relative 
weights, helping decision-makers to take informed decisions and public opinion to have 
a grounded idea on how public money is spent. 
In the case of Italy, the high-speed programme is one of the largest infrastructure 
investment after WWII, but it was not subject to an economic assessment prior to 
decision. In the paper we performed an ex-post analysis, in the light of important changes 
occurred in the market a few years after opening. In fact, in the first three years, we 
observed an increase in demand, due to the time savings allowed from the new line, but 
these benefits were far from counterbalancing the investment cost. In 2012 and later, a 
private newcomer, NTV, entered in the market with a comparable supply and serving 
similar routes than Trenitalia. The effect was disruptive: for both competitors quality 
increased, prices felt, frequencies and seats increased and ultimately patronage had a 
dramatic rise, above the most optimistic expectations. 
The cost-benefit analysis clarified that the time benefits were a fraction of the cost, also 
because of a problem of overdesign that raised per-km investment cost to a level higher 
than any other comparable European case. Much more benefits are instead associated to 
the new demand, to increased frequency and to the introduction of mixed traditional/high-
speed services outside of the high-speed infrastructure. 
In conclusion, it would be important to consider that, under some conditions such as 
high population served, head-on competition can contribute much more than marginally 
in the socio-economic viability of transport megaprojects. In the present case it was able 
to make marginally positive an investment conceived for totally different purposes and 
doomed by the original sin of overdesign. Clearly it is not the panacea to make feasible 
all politicians’ pet-projects, but can make the difference in some cases. From the 
methodological point of view, we showed how to use CBA to evaluate “unconventional” 
benefits, such as Mohring effect, network effect and competition-generated demand, 
which are aspects usually less considered in literature.  
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Annex: methodology and data 
General methodology 
The cost-benefit analysis was developed according to the general methodology 
suggested in DG Regio (2014).  
For the cost side, we included the usual elements: investment cost, O&M costs 
(parametrically estimated), residual value. The benefits’ side includes consumers’ surplus 
(rail users travel time savings), producers Surplus (delta revenues of the rail operators), 
externalities. All benefits and costs have been discounted to 2010. 
The key point of the analysis lays in the variation in consumers’ surplus. According to 
the guidelines, it was estimated using the ‘Rule of Half’ approach for all the traffic 
components (existing, diverted from other modes and induced ex-novo). The way this has 
been carried is described in detail below. 
For all scenarios and line sections we calculated the usual indicators: 
NPV, net present value: the sum of the discounted economic net flows of a project. If 
positive, indicates that the actualised benefits exceed the actualised costs during the entire 
lifetime of the project: 
 = 	





NBIR, net benefits over investment ratio: a synthetic indicator showing the net benefit 
(benefits minus operation costs) for every Euro spent in the investment phase. A ratio 
above one means that the project is worthwhile. 
BCR, benefit cost ratio: the ratio between all discounted benefits and all discounted 
costs. Similarly to NBIR a ratio above one is the threshold for beneficial projects. In 
principle, the two indicators are similar when the investment cost is the largest part of all 
costs of the project. In some of our scenarios there is no investment cost (those modifying 
only the competitive environment) and thus the BCR is the only possible benefit cost 
ratio. 
In the following paragraphs we clarify how each of the main components of the analysis 
have been calculated, including all used sources and specifying when the unavailability 
of data required the use of educated guesses. 
Traffic data 
No official data exist on patronage of high-speed rail services in Italy. We estimated 
traffic data per section in Table 6 from our former evaluation (Beria and Grimaldi, 2011) 
for 2010 and from Dell’Alba and Velardi (2015) for 2013.  
 
Section 2010 2013 
Sections where investment occurred 
Turin-Milan 1.3 3.8 
Milan-Bologna 6.6 12.8 
Bologna-Florence 10.9 18.0 
Rome-Naples 2.9 7.5 
Sections benefited from increase in services 
Florence-Rome 9.3 17.5 
Venice-Bologna 1.3 3.1 




Table 6. Million-passenger traffic on sections where investment occurred and on sections directly 
benefited from increase in services (our estimates). 
Data on operated services on different sections are taken from official timetables (2010 
and 2015). 
 
Section 2010 2015 
Sections where investment occurred 
Turin-Milan 18 46 
Milan-Bologna 68 125 
Bologna-Florence 100 184 
Rome-Naples 40 98 
Sections benefited from increase in services 
Florence-Rome 98 182 
Venice-Bologna 26 48 
Table 7. Daily services (both directions) on sections where investment occurred and on sections directly 
benefited from increase in services (source: official timetables). Non-stop services included. 
Basing on 2010 and 2013 demand figures and on 2015 supply, we define our traffic 
scenarios applying different trends for the future, obtaining Table 8 passenger and service 
volumes. Intervention scenarios combine the gap due to speed increase (occurred in 
2009), a base growth of 3% and the growth observed between 2011 and 2013, due to 
competition. For all years the volumes for different sections maintain the same 
proportions as in 2013. Patronage for 2014 and 2015 has been estimated from 2013 as 
proportional to declared load factors and supply increase. For the following years, a 




Passenger*km/year [M] 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 
Intervention scenario 5,888.9 13,038.8 14,867.6 15,626.0 16,260.5 
Reference scenario 3,925.9 4,626.4 5,024.7 5,281.0 5,495.5 
            
Train*km/day 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 
Intervention scenario 65,132.0 127,605.0 136,426.0 143,820.0 149,440.0 
Reference scenario 67,926.0 72,815.5 74,136.0 76,236.0 77,700.0 
 
Alternative 1.b 
Passenger*km/year [M] 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 
Intervention scenario 5,888.9 13,038.8 14,867.6 15,626.0 16,260.5 
Reference scenario 3,925.9 6,309.7 7,913.8 8,317.5 8,655.2 
            
Train*km/day 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 
Intervention scenario 65,132.0 127,605.0 136,426.0 143,820.0 149,440.0 
Reference scenario 67,926.0 88,555.6 95,242.0 97,080.0 98,988.0 
 
Alternative 1.c 
Passenger*km/year [M] 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 
Intervention scenario 5,888.9 13,038.8 14,867.6 15,626.0 16,260.5 
Reference scenario 3,925.9 7,428.0 10,065.9 10,579.3 11,008.9 
            
Train*km/day 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 
Intervention scenario 65,132.0 127,605.0 136,426.0 143,820.0 149,440.0 
Reference scenario 67,926.0 98,402.8 108,206.0 110,818.0 112,474.0 
 





Passenger*km/year [M] 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 
Intervention scenario 5,888.9 6,591.7 7,516.3 7,899.7 8,220.4 
Reference scenario 3,925.9 4,604.7 5,001.2 5,256.3 5,469.7 
            
Train*km/day 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 
Intervention scenario 89,504.3 95,373.2 101,904.0 107,094.0 111,418.0 
Reference scenario 67,926.0 72,815.5 74,136.0 76,236.0 77,700.0 
 
Alternative 3.a 
Passenger*km/year [M] 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 
Intervention scenario 3,925.9 8,692.5 9,911.7 10,417.3 10,840.3 
Reference scenario 3,925.9 4,547.0 4,938.5 5,190.4 5,401.2 
            
Train*km/day 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 
Intervention scenario 71,043.3 85,070.0 90,748.0 95,220.0 99,376.0 
Reference scenario 67,926.0 72,815.5 74,136.0 76,236.0 77,700.0 
 
Alternative 3.b 
Passenger*km/year [M] 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 
Intervention scenario 3,925.9 6,898.6 7,866.2 8,267.4 8,603.1 
Reference scenario 3,925.9 4,536.4 4,927.0 5,178.3 5,388.5 
            
Train*km/day 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 
Intervention scenario 71,043.3 66,522.6 70,456.0 74,168.0 76,780.0 
Reference scenario 67,926.0 72,815.5 74,136.0 76,236.0 77,700.0 
Table 8. Passenger and service volumes in different scenario (our estimates) 
Investment costs and residual value 
Investment costs were provided by the Italian rail infrastructure manager (RFI, 2007), 
and summarised in Table 9 (financial values). In the CBA they were evenly distributed 
among 2002 and 2009 and converted to €2010 present value. Financial values were 
corrected to economic ones using a shadow price of 0.85 (our elaboration on NUVV, 
2001). Scenarios 3.a and 3.b do not entail investment costs, fictitiously assuming 




Cost per km* Line description 
 
M€ M€/km  
Turin – Milan 7,788 54 Plain line in agricultural area, along the highway 
Milan – Bologna 6,916 31 Plain line in agricultural area, along the highway 
Bologna – Florence 5,877 68 Semi-continuous tunnel in complex rock 
Rome – Naples 5,671 24 Plain / hilly line in agricultural area 
Table 9. Construction costs per line section and travel times, Italy (our elaboration on RFI, 2007, and 
Beria & Grimaldi, 2012) 
The residual value was conventionally set to be 50% of the economic investment costs 
(in 2039). 
Operating costs 
Operating costs of trains were calculated using economic unit operating cost values of 
12 €/train-km for high-speed services and of 13.3 €/train-km for slower conventional 
services (our elaboration on RFI, 2005). These unit costs are applied to the supply 




volumes of Table 8. Infrastructure operating costs of the lines are included in operating 
costs of rail services and thus are not double-counted. 
Variation in users’ surplus: reduction in travel and waiting times and in fares 
The calculation of users surplus is the core of the CBA and the most delicate operation. 
In absence of a full transport model, as mentioned above, we follow the guidelines and 
use the so-called “Rule of Half”. In practice, we assume that existing passengers (those 
already using the train before, in this case the 2010 figures minus the 50% additional 
traffic of 2010) receive the full travel time reduction benefit. Instead, those using other 
modes before (car, plane or no travel) and whose initial cost is unknown, receive half of 
the entire benefit. This represent a linear demand function, where the former marginal 
user gets the full benefit as the existing users and the new marginal user gets zero benefit 
from the mode change. 
Unit tavel time savings are derived from official timetables before and after the 
investment. Time savings are present only in alternatives that foresee HS lines to be built 
in the intervention scenario (1.a, 1.b, 1.c and 2). Venice – Bologna and Florence – Rome 
travel times lines do not change with respect to reference scenario and thus the benefit 












Table 10. Travel time savings per section (our elaboration on official timetables 1999-2015) 
Travel time savings are not the only time benefit. The competition and the extra demand 
had increased significantly the number of trains, thus reducing the waiting time (or, more 
appropriately, the anticipate arrival at destination). This externality is known as Mohring 
Effect. Waiting time for the scenarios is defined as half the headway2 between two 
following services in the same direction and the reduction of headway in the intervention 
scenarios is the unit benefit considered. 
Travel time savings are valued using an average value of travel time of 20 €/passenger-
hour, while waiting time savings valued using an average value of waiting time of 30 
€/passenger-hour.  
A further benefit for users is the possible reduction in fares. We observe that 
competition among NTV and Trenitalia actually entailed a reduction in average fares 
from 12 to 9 €cent/passenger-km (our elaboration on Cascetta and Coppola, 2014). As 
explained in section 3.2, although this reduction represents a transfer between the users’ 
and producers’ surpluses, it contributes defining the collective benefits for users shifting 
transport mode. 
                                                 
2
 Headway is defined dividing the number of daily services per direction by 14 operating hours. The 
maximum value of waiting time is set to 1 hour, to consider that in this cases regional trains become a better 
option (this has a limited effect only on the Milan-Turin). Moreover, since the analysis is made on a section 
basis, the amount of passengers on each section is multiplied by 0.491, which is the amount of passengers 
on the whole network of services over the sum of passengers on each section, to take into account of the 
fact that most passengers use different sections in a single trip. 




Correction of transfers in the ‘Rule of Half’: fuel taxes, motorway tolls and rail 
service revenues 
Benefits for new users (both diverted and generated) are calculated using the ‘Rule of 
Half’, applied to perceived (private) costs and not to social ones. For this reason, the CBA 
must be corrected rebalancing the transfers within society. For example, the reduction of 
fares is a benefit for users, but a cost for producers, and in fact it is not a net benefit except 
for the additional traffic. The same is true for fuel duties and motorway tolls. 
Lost revenues in fuel taxes for the Government are calculated with a unit fuel tax of 4 
€cent/passenger-km (our elaboration on Beria et al., 2012); lost motorway tolls for the 
concessionaries are calculated with a unit toll of 4.1 €cent/passenger-km (our elaboration 
on Italian motorways’ website). Those unit values are multiplied by the component 
diverted from car (20.4%, according to Cascetta and Coppola, 2014) of the difference in 
passenger-km between the reference and intervention scenarios (Table 8). 
Generated revenues for the producers of high-speed rail services are calculated with a 
unit average revenue multiplied by the difference in passenger-km between the reference 
and intervention scenario (Table 8). 
In alternatives and scenarios entailing (full or “half) competition, unit revenues are set 
to linearly decrease from 12 to 9 €cent/passenger-km 2010 to 2013 and to be constant at 
9 €cent/passenger-km from 2013 on (our elaboration on Cascetta and Coppola, 2014); 
when no competition is foreseen, unit revenue is set constant at 12 €cent/passenger-km. 
Externalities 
The last component of social surplus is represented by externalities: accidents, local 
and global pollution, noise, upstream and downstream effects (Maibach et al., 2008).  
In this case, we observe a significant shift from car and from plane to the train thanks 
to competition and increased speed. This modal shift cuts the related car and plane 
externalities. We quantify them in 5 €cent/passenger-km (Campos and de Rus, 2009; 
Beria et al., 2012) for passenger shifted from private car (20.4% of new rail users, 
according to Cascetta and Coppola) and 3 €cent/passenger-km (Campos and de Rus, 
2009; Maibach et al., 2008) for those shifted from air transport (31%, ibid). 
However, the extra rail services (and the increased speed) cause an increase in external 
costs of rail (mainly noise). We parametrically give 1€/train-km for HS trains and 0.9 for 
the conventional ones. 
 
